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THE FRENCH VEIL BAN: A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
FEMINIST APPROACH
Sital Kalantry*
I.

INTRODUCTION

After the gruesome terrorist attack that killed eighty-four people in
Nice, many beach towns in France began to ban Muslim women from
wearing the “burkini” on beaches.1 The burkini, which was created
by an Australian designer, is modest swimwear that covers the body
and hair.2 The Nice attack occurred on the heels of a series of attacks
in France.3 The timing of the French burkini ban suggests it was
targeting Muslims due to the anger over the attacks. The argument
that burkinis are not hygienic is a fig leaf for other more pernicious
justifications.4 Others argue that religious garb generally contravenes
the French vision of secularism.5 Another line of attack against the
burkini relates to gender equality. For example, the French Prime

*

1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

Clinical Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thank you to Professors Michele
Gilman and Margaret Johnson for inviting me to speak at the annual conference of
the Center on Applied Feminism. I am also grateful to the editors of the University
of Baltimore Law Review for their terrific editorial work. This article is based on
chapters from a book I have written, Women’s Human Rights and Migration: SexSelective Abortion Laws in the United States and India (forthcoming 2017).
Sahar Bandial, The Burkini Ban, EXPRESS TRIBUNE: OPINION (Aug. 21, 2016),
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1166690/the-burkini-ban/; Alan Yuhas et al., Nice
Attack: Truck Driver Named as France Mourns 84 Killed in Bastille Day Atrocity—
As It Happened, GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jul/14/nice-bastille-day-france-attackpromenade-des-anglais-vehicle (last updated July 16, 2016).
Shoba Rao, The Australian Inventor of the Burkini Says Recent Bans on the Swimsuit
in France Are ‘Unfair,’ NEWS.COM.AU (Aug. 25, 2016, 9:28 PM),
http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/fashion/the-australian-inventor-of-the-burkinisays-recent-bans-on-the-swimsuit-in-france-are-unfair/newsstory/be6b7b5bb5e9d657bf671891ff8de048.
Faith Karimi, Attack in Nice: New Terror in France Months After Mass Shooting,
CNN (July 15, 2016, 8:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/15/europe/terrorattacks-nice-why-france/.
Anya Cordell, Burkini Bans, Muslim ‘Hygiene,’ and the History of the Holocaust,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2016, 2:51 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-kind-of-swimsuit-trauma-i-hatewhat-thatmuslim_us_57b68c08e4b007f18197839f.
Bandial, supra note 1.
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Minister argues that the burkini reinforces the “enslavement of
women.”6
In this article, I will focus on arguments that justify bans on
Muslim women’s religious clothing on the basis that they are
oppressive to women.7 In large part, women who wear the full-face
veil are themselves migrants or the progeny of migrants. I will
examine the French debates surrounding the ban of the full-face veil
in 2010 and the European Court of Human Rights decision that
upheld that veil ban.8 This discussion illustrates that policymakers,
feminists and other stakeholders in migrant-receiving countries
decontextualize immigrant women’s behavior.
That is, their
understanding that the veil is oppressive to women in France is
sometimes informed by their understanding of the practice in foreign
countries. Decontextualization attributes meaning to a practice that it
may not have and also fails to recognize the distinct meaning the
covering gains in France, a region where Islam is a minority religion.
On the other hand, I will argue that when policymakers in migrantreceiving countries should be open to the possibility that even if they
perceive that a practice is oppressive to women in the foreign
country, they should not automatically assume that the practice
undermines women’s rights in the migrant-receiving country.9
Feminist legal theories have been very successful in providing a
lens to evaluate laws and regulations from the perspective of
women’s equality.10 However, American feminist legal theory has
generally not been open to the view that practices can change
meaning so radically when they are undertaken in different
geographical contexts.11 This position is understandable because
6.

7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Catie L’Heureux, French Prime Minister Supports Banning the Muslim Burkini,
Supposedly to Free Women from ‘Enslavement,’ N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 17, 2016, 3:29
PM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/08/french-prime-minister-supports-franceburkini-ban.html.
Some Muslim women may also wear a loose headscarf, a cloth that covers all the
hair, or a full-face covering, and it may also include a loose black covering over the
entire body. Russell Goldman, What’s That You’re Wearing? A Guide to Muslim
Veils, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/world/whatin-the-world/burqa-hijab-abaya-chador.html; James Vyver, Explainer: Why Do
Muslim Women Wear a Burka, Niqab or Hijab?, AUSTL. BROADCASTING CORP.,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-23/why-do-muslim-women-wear-a-burkaniqab-or-hijab/5761510 (last updated Oct. 2, 2014, 12:19 AM).
See infra Parts IV–V.
See infra Part VI.
Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Legal Theory, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC.
POL’Y. L. 13, 15 (2005).
See, e.g., Sital Kalantry, Sex Selection in the United States and India: A
Contextualist Feminist Approach, 18 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 61, 64–65
(2013) [hereinafter Kalantry I] (“Pro-choice groups have typically taken universal
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these theories were largely aimed at assessing and addressing
women’s inequality in one country’s context and developing legal
remedies to address those harms.12 I build on American feminist
legal theory to propose a transnational feminist approach.
The thrust of international human rights theory supports the
conclusion that if a practice is seen as discriminatory against women
in one context it will also have the same impact in another context.
The dominant discourse among scholars and practitioners alike views
rights as “universal.”13 In other words, if a practice violates a right
(such as the freedom from gender discrimination) in one country, that
same practice undertaken in another country is also deemed to violate
human rights. In contrast to universality is cultural relativism.14 A
strong cultural relativist would argue that even traditional or religious
practices that deprive women of autonomy and equality by most
objective standards do not contravene human rights.15 Under that
view, human rights themselves are defined by culture and religion.
While I disagree with this framing of cultural relativism, I think that
some practices that are brought by immigrants from one country to
another cannot simply be explained by universalism. I call these
practices “cross-border practices.”
The transnational feminist
approach I propose opens a theoretical space between cultural
relativism and universality with the aim of evaluating whether or not
cross-border practices are oppressive to women.16 In this article, I do
not draw a conclusion about whether or not France’s full-face veil
ban adopted in 2010 is consistent with gender equality or is

12.
13.

14.

15.
16.

positions on sex selection bans, arguing that bans on sex selection should not be put
into place in the United States, India, or elsewhere.”).
See, e.g., id. (“[T]he pro-life movement has been increasingly using information,
often framed in a distorted way, about the practice and reasons for sex selection
abortion in foreign countries.”).
See, e.g., What are Human Rights?, U.N. HUM. RTS.: OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx (last visited Dec. 19,
2016) (“Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our
nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
language, or any other status.”).
Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence
Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 49, 59 (1993) (“Because the meaning of human rights is substantially different
from culture to culture, relativists claim that international human rights law is
meaningless.”).
See Mahnaz Afkhami, Cultural Relativism and Women’s Human Rights, MAHNAZ
AFKHAMI (Jan. 1, 2000), http://www.mahnazafkhami.net/2000/cultural-relativismand-womens-human-rights/.
See infra Parts II–III.
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oppressive to women. Rather I demonstrate why a transnational
feminist framework would be helpful in sorting through that question.
In Part II, I explain the limitations of feminist legal theories and
international human rights law in understanding cross-border
practices.17
In Part III, pushing feminist legal theories in
transnational directions, I outline the broad features of an approach
that takes into account both the context of the country of origin and
country of destination of the migrant.18 In Part IV, I demonstrate
how arguments in support of a veil ban in France relied on the views
that the veil is repressive to women in other countries.19 In Part V, I
explain how the European Court of Human Rights unduly relied on
justifications for a veil ban from another context when evaluating the
French veil ban.20 In Part VI, I describe a methodology to evaluate
veil bans in migrant-receiving countries.21
II. CONTEXT AND RIGHTS IN FEMINIST LEGAL THEORIES
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS
Traditional American feminist legal theories were successfully
used in the United States to push for women’s equality. These
theories emerged to address inequalities in one domestic context—the
United States.22 Liberal feminists promoted gender-neutral laws in
all situations without regard to their impact.23 While cultural
feminists took into account social context, it was always fixed;
women had certain shared traits (although the traits were different
from men’s traits).24
Anti-subordination legal theorists also
emphasized the difference between men and women.25 Yet they
believed that since men and women were not equal in society,
treating them the same in the law would not necessarily promote
equality.26 But again, for these feminists, context is fixed and
unchanging.27 Consequently, it seems that liberal feminists, cultural
feminists, and dominance feminists would all agree on one thing: if a
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 21–22
(1988).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 13.
See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 202–03 (1989).
Id. at 201.
See Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 78–79.
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policy promotes women’s equality in one country’s context, then it
has the same impact in a different country’s context.
In addition, international human rights theory and practice also
suggests that once a practice is determined to be oppressive to
women in one context, it is presumed to be oppressive when it
emerges in a totally distinct context of another country.
A. Context in Traditional Feminist Legal Theories
Contemporary legal feminism traces its roots to the 1970s, when
early feminist activists struggled against laws that were formally
unequal.28 They pushed for women to be able to engage in
traditionally male-dominated activities.29 Prior to the 1980s, many
laws contained sex-based distinctions.30 For example, only women
could receive alimony, only men could be drafted, and the age of
majority was different for men and women.31 Essentially, laws were
motivated by the idea that a woman’s appropriate role was in the
private sphere of family and the home.32 This form of feminism,
which reacted against such laws, is often referred to as “liberal
feminism.”33
In the 1970s, court victories erased many formal gender-based
distinctions in the law. One prominent example is the case of Reed v.
Reed where the U.S. Supreme Court held a statute that permitted only
men to be executors of an estate unconstitutional.34 It should be
noted that 1970s feminists would advocate not only for changing
laws that benefit only men, but also for changing laws that benefit
only women. For example, they helped to eradicate the “tender years
doctrine,” which gave women preference in child custody cases.35
These feminists emphasized “women’s similarity to men.”36 Most
liberal feminists would not push the law beyond formal equality with
men.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See, e.g., Cain, supra note 25, at 197.
See id. at 211–12.
See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270 (1979).
See, e.g., id. (questioning whether “Alabama alimony statutes which provide that
husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce” are
constitutional).
See id. at 279–80.
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 25 (Richard A.
Epstein et al. eds., 1999).
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).
See Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism, and the
Dependency Dilemma, in JOINT CUSTODY & SHARED PARENTING 63, 63–87 (Jay
Folberg ed., 2d ed. 1991).
CHAMALLAS, supra note 33, at 24–25.
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In liberal feminism, context is nearly irrelevant. Making laws
gender neutral and ensuring formal equality is assumed to promote
women’s equality, regardless of their impact on society.37 That is,
liberal feminists assumed that giving women the same rights as men
would translate into women’s equality on the ground level.38 It was
difficult for them to contend with biological differences where equal
treatment could be disadvantageous to women.39
Taking feminism in a new direction, scholars emerging in the
1980s emphasized women’s differences from men and proposed that
any evaluation of laws and policies should take that fundamental
notion into account.40 Taking their cue from Carol Gilligan’s work,
cultural feminists found that women’s behavioral differences were
tied to their sex.41 Critics of cultural feminism argue that sex
“essentializes” women’s behavior.42 While these feminists took into
account social context, their thinking was always fixed—all women
shared certain traits that were different from those of men.43
Anti-subordination legal theorists also emphasized the difference
between men and women.44 Men’s and women’s different roles and
privileges in society contributed to women’s inequality.45 If men and
women were not equal in society, then treating them the same in the
law would not necessarily promote equality.46 These scholars
believed that gender was socially constructed rather than fixed.47
According to a prominent anti-subordination theorist, Catharine
MacKinnon, women’s inequality in society was the result of

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 24.
See id. at 24–25.
Id. at 26.
See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215–16
(1989).
See, e.g., West, supra note 22, at 16–18.
Verta Taylor & Leila J. Rupp, Women’s Culture and Lesbian Feminist Activism: A
Reconsideration of Cultural Feminism, 19 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y
32, 41–42 (1993).
See id. at 41.
See Ruth Colker, The Anti-Subordination Principle: Applications, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S
L.J. 59, 60 (1987).
See e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White
Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 15 (1991).
Cain, supra note 25, at 201.
MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 113; see Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Reconstructing
MacKinnon: Essentialism, Humanism, Feminism, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S
STUD. 89, 96 (1996) (noting that “[o]ne’s gender . . . is constituted by the role one is
sexually situated to play in society: to be male is to be socially consigned to sexual
dominance; to be female is to be socially consigned to sexual subjugation.”).
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oppression by men, not biology.48 MacKinnon’s approach rejected
the idea that men and women should be treated identically.49 Instead,
she believes that in some cases identical treatment can lead to
subordination.50 Anti-subordination theorists would be willing to
deviate from formally equal laws if doing so would benefit women in
practice.51
For MacKinnon, however, even though the impact of laws must be
evaluated within context, the context is fixed and unchanging.52 Her
theory is animated by the assumption that every society is defined by
male dominance over women.53 In her view, the legal system was
principally designed to perpetuate male dominance over women.54
Sexual abuse and sexual relationships were the fundamental ways in
which women were oppressed.55 Consequently, under dominance
theory, if a policy promotes women’s equality in one country’s
context, then it would be assumed to have the same impact in a
different country’s context.56 Thus, the mainline feminist legal
theories could not conceive of a practice as contextual—having
48.
49.
50.

51.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 95 (“[W]omen as a group are dominated by men as a
group, and therefore as individuals. . . . [W]omen are subordinated in society, not by
personal nature or by biology.”).
See id. at 226–27 (“Abstract equality necessarily reinforces the inequalities of the
status quo to the extent that it evenly reflects an unequal social arrangement.”).
See id. at 234 (“The mainstream law of equality assumes that society is already
fundamentally equal. It gives women legally no more than they already have
socially, and little it cannot also give men. Actually doing anything for women under
sex equality law is thus stigmatized as special protection or affirmative action rather
than simply recognized as nondiscrimination or equality for the first time.”).
See, e.g., West, supra note 22, at 59 (discussing the disparate effects on men and
women arising from rape law); see also MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 241–42
(discussing laws that that “purport to protect women as part of the community,” but
actually serve to subordinate women).
See CHAMALLAS, supra note 33, at 18 (“The theme of some recent feminist
scholarship can be described as ‘the more things change, the more they stay the
same.’”).
See MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 237 (arguing that “[l]iberal legalism is . . . a
medium for making male dominance both invisible and legitimate by adopting the
male point of view in law at the same time as it enforces that view on society.”).
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflection on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1282–85 (1991).
Deborah Schwenk, Book Review, 12 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 205 (1990) (reviewing
MACKINNON, supra note 40).
It should be noted that context (though not geographic context) was very important
to feminist legal methods. In describing the various feminist legal methods,
Professor Bartlett discusses context in the following ways: the context of multiple
identities, the social context, the factual context of a case, the context of community
norms, and the historical context. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 849–51, 854 (1990).
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differing impacts on women’s equality based on the magnitude of the
practice, social norms of inequality within which the practice
manifests itself, and other contextual factors.
B. Context in International Human Rights Law: Universality v.
Cultural Relativism
The debate about whether international human rights should apply
universally across cultures and countries or whether they should vary
based on culture is age-old.57 In the early 1990s, this binary frame to
human rights also elicited much debate about women’s rights.58 A
“strong” cultural relativist would “assert that culture is the sole or
primary source of the validity of a practice or claim to a moral
right.”59 The supporters of universalism often draw upon natural law
and reason and argue that there are objective standards by which to
judge human conduct and to create law.60 Universalism “assumes
that there is a law that is so basic, so ‘natural,’ that it exists in all
communities.”61
Debates emerged between feminists and cultural relativists—
“[w]hat feminists view as inequality,” a cultural relativist would
claim “is actually egalitarianism ‘in unfamiliar contexts.’”62 What
Western feminists may consider oppressive, Western cultural
relativists may consider cultural preservation.63 For example, much
feminist debate ensued in the 1990s about whether or not the practice
of female genital cutting was oppressive to women in Africa.64

57.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See generally Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6
HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984) (discussing the tension between cultural variability in
human rights and the universal rights afforded to everyone); John Kleinig, Cultural
Relativism and Human Rights, in TEACHING HUMAN RIGHTS 111 (A. Tay ed., 1981)
(reviewing cultural differences throughout history and the effect on universal human
rights); Christopher C. Joyner & John C. Dettling, Bridging the Cultural Chasm:
Cultural Relativism and the Future of International Law, 20 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 275
(1990) (providing a conceptual analysis of cultural relativism by fleshing out the
problems associated with its nature and the relationship between culture and
international law); Fernando R. Tesón, International Human Rights and Cultural
Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 869 (1985) (discussing the effects of the
universalization of the concern for human dignity as international law responds to
the demands for individual freedom, which challenges state practices reflecting
geographical and cultural particularities).
See Kim, supra note 14, at 56.
See id. at 56.
Id. at 63–64.
Kim, supra note 14, at 63–64.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id.
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Tracy Higgins, a feminist and international human rights legal
scholar, astutely observed the intervention of anti-essentialist
feminists in the debates between universalism and cultural relativism
in international human rights theory and policy.65 She notes the
parallels in the critiques made by anti-essentialist feminists against
mainstream feminism to the critiques made by relativists to
universalism:66
Responding to this division, anti-essentialist feminists
have attempted to rethink both the various descriptions of
gender oppression that have been offered and the
assumption that gender oppression can be described
meaningfully along a single axis. Instead, they have focused
on local, contextualized problems of gender oppression. In
this sense, anti-essentialism's criticism of general accounts
of women’s oppression parallels cultural relativism's
critique of universal theories of human rights. Like cultural
relativism, feminist anti-essentialism seems to lead to the
conclusion that gender inequality cannot be explained crossculturally.67
In observing the challenges in resolving the debate between the
universalists and relativists, Professor Higgins points out that:
Confronted with the challenge of cultural relativism,
feminism faces divergent paths, neither of which seems to
lead out of the woods of patriarchy. The first path, leading
to simple tolerance of cultural difference, is too broad. To
follow it would require feminists to ignore pervasive limits
on women’s freedom in the name of an autonomy that exists
for women in theory only. The other path, leading to
objective condemnation of cultural practices, is too narrow.
To follow it would require feminists to dismiss
the culturally distinct experiences of women as false
consciousness.68
She concluded that, “For feminists, the challenge is simultaneously to
reject universalist human rights claims that fail to account for
65.
66.
67.
68.

Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 103 (1996).
Id. at 102–03.
Id.
Id. at 125–26.
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difference and to embrace a normative conception of gender justice
that is critical of patriarchy across cultures.”69 I heed her warning.
My proposal is not a wide-scale rejection of a common notion of
gender equality; rather, I argue at the margins for some flexibility.
Moreover, I am asking a different question from those addressed by
early feminist debates in international human rights. The question
those debates revolved around was whether or not a practice was
repressive to women within the context in which it originated.70 On
the other hand, the question I ask in this article is whether or not a
practice that is undertaken in a context other than the one in which it
originated is oppressive to women.
These two sets of questions have not always been treated separately
in international human rights theory.71 Questions about cross-border
practices (i.e., practices brought from one country to another by
migrants) have not been distinguished from the questions about
whether or not human rights are universal or culturally relative.
Universality has largely won the day in international human rights
law and practice.72 International human rights organizations are
reluctant to deviate from the principle of universality, in part, because
it gives their positions moral authority.73 They may also feel
uncomfortable taking conflicting positions on the same practice (e.g.,
that veil bans are permissible in one country, but not in another).
Some scholars and advocates may resist deviating from universality
as it implies the acceptance of cultural relativism. For all of these
reasons, the thrust of international human rights discourse generally
has not been amenable to the view that a practice could be a human
rights violation in one context, but not in another.
C. Context in Karima Bennoune’s Work
Professor Karima Bennoune’s work pushes against the notion of
universality. Focusing on veil bans in Europe, she argues that
whether or not veil bans are appropriate depends on the context.74
She points out that her proposal provides “an innovative contextual
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 105.
See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Critiques of International Law and Their
Critics, 1994–1995 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1994).
See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text.
See generally Donnelly, supra note 57 (exploring “several different senses of
‘universal’ human rights”).
See id. at 291.
Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of
Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women’s Equality Under International
Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 367, 371 (2007).
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approach to assessing the international legality of bans in public
schools on ‘modest’ garments claimed to be required by religious
beliefs for Muslim women.”75 She elaborates that a contextual
analysis of bans on modest dress of Muslim women would examine a
range of factors:
[T]he impact of the garments on other women (or girls) in
the same environment; coercion of women in the context,
including activities of religious extremist organizations;
gender discrimination; related violence against women in
the location; the motivation of those imposing the
restriction; Islamophobia, if relevant, or religious
discrimination in the context; the alternatives to restrictions;
the possible consequences for human rights both of
restrictions and a lack thereof; and whether or not there has
been consultation with impacted constituencies (both those
impacted by restrictions and by a lack of restrictions on such
garments), and, if so, what their views are.76
She examines two court decisions—the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) judgment in Sahin v. Turkey (2004)77 and the British
House of Lords judgment in Begum v. Headteacher.78 In Sahin, the
ECHR held that Turkey’s ban on the headscarf in universities did not
violate the European Convention on Human Rights’ guarantee of
religious expression.79 On the other hand, in Begum, the House of
Lords upheld a school’s ban on the jilbab, which is a long cloak
covering everything but the head, hands, and feet.80 While she
appears to be open to the possibility that veil bans are impermissible
in some countries but not in others, Bennoune finds the bans to be
justified in both countries she considered—Turkey and the U.K.81
In Sahin, the issue before the ECHR was whether the Turkish ban
violated a woman’s right to free expression under the European
Convention of Human Rights (“Convention”).82
Under the
Convention, this right can be limited in order to protect the rights of
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 367.
Id. at 396.
Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), aff'd, App. No. 44774/98,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
R v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 (HL)
(appeal taken from Eng.).
Sahin, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3–4.
Bennoune, supra note 74, at 410.
See id. at 414–15.
Sahin, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1.
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others.83 Bennoune asserts that the Turkish ban was appropriate
because “[e]ven to the extent that for some women, the choice to
wear a headscarf is their own, and is for them an expression of
religious belief, this limitation on that choice is necessary in context
to protect the rights of others.”84
She also concludes that the ban in the United Kingdom on the more
restrictive clothing was appropriate in a situation where a less
restrictive headscarf was still available and where there was evidence
that some girls would have felt coerced into wearing the restrictive
dress if it were not banned.85 Bennoune points out that her
conclusion that the bans were appropriate in both Turkey and the
U.K. cases hinges upon the fact that they were in “public educational
institutions, which shape the identities of future generations and forge
the public consensus about gender roles and equality.”86
On the other hand, she argues that while bans in Turkey and the
U.K. were appropriate, it would be inappropriate to ban it in the
American law school where she teaches because so few women wear
them.87 The magnitude of the practice in the context in which it
occurs appears to be an important consideration in determining
whether to ban it.88 Even though she believes both bans in Turkey
and the U.K. were appropriate, her contextual approach in evaluating
bans leaves open the possibility that in some contexts, veil bans may
not be appropriate.89 Bennoune also briefly discusses France’s 2004
law restricting religious dress in schools, but does not draw any
conclusions about its legitimacy.90 She notes that “[t]he French law
perches in between as a truly hard case.”91 In Part IV, I discuss
France’s full-face ban adopted in 2010, three years after the
publication of Bennoune’s article. I build on Bennoune’s approach to
veil bans to develop a methodology for evaluating the human rights
consequences of veil bans.
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84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
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Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Convention].
Bennoune, supra note 74, at 386.
Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 389–90.
Id. at 396.
See id. at 416.
Id. at 413–16.
Id. at 416.
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III. TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST LEGAL APPROACH TO
CROSS-BORDER PRACTICES
As described above, American feminist legal theory has generally
taken a universal understanding to rights: if a practice is viewed as
harmful to women in one country context, it will also be assumed to
be harmful to women in another country context.92 Similarly, under
international human rights doctrine, there are two main ways to
understand human rights: universal or culturally relative.93 The
principle of universality—that everyone essentially has the same
human rights everywhere—has won the day among modern human
rights organizations, institutions, and scholarship.94 Any deviation
from universality is thought to be an argument in favor of cultural
relativism.95 Under the extreme version of cultural relativism, human
rights gain meaning from religious and cultural values in any given
society.96 Something is considered a human right in any given
society only if it is consistent with cultural values.97
I argue for a position somewhere between those polar opposites.98
I propose a transnational feminist legal approach to cross-border
practices, which recognizes that a practice can contravene women’s
equality in one social and country context, but may not have the same
impact in another. Some practices change meaning over time and in
different social, historical, political, and other contexts.99 I developed
this transnational feminist methodology in greater depth elsewhere100
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See Kim, supra note 14, at 49–50.
Higgins, supra note 65, at 93.
Kim, supra note 14, at 63–64.
See Higgins, supra note 65, at 91.
Kim, supra note 14, at 56, 58–59.
See generally Donnelly, supra note 57, at 411 (“Human rights are inherently
‘individualistic’; they are rights held by individuals in relation to, even against, the
state and society.”).
See, e.g., Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 64–65 (proposing a contextualized feminist
approach while discussing the legality of sex-selective abortion); SITAL KALANTRY,
WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND MIGRATION: SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND INDIA (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter KALANTRY II].
See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 56, at 877–78 (“[T]he postmodern view posits that the
realities experienced by the subject are not in any way transcendent or
representational, but rather particular and fluctuating, constituted within a complex
set of social contexts. Within this position, being human, or female, is strictly a
matter of social, historical, and cultural construction.”).
See, e.g., Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 64–65 (proposing a contextuali zed feminist
approach while discussing the legality of sex-selective abortion); KALANTRY II,
supra note 98.
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and have examined sex-selective abortion bans through the lens of
this framework.101
I want to be clear that I am not arguing that all cross-border
practices are consistent with women’s equality or that none of them
should be prohibited. Nor am I arguing that all cross-border practices
are morally acceptable. I am simply suggesting that we need to be
open to the possibility that a cross-border practice, although harmful
to women in one country, may not be oppressive when undertaken in
another country.
It is important to make this distinction because, in some cases, bans
on a practice that are justified for the sake of promoting women’s
equality do not necessarily promote equality, but rather only restrict
other rights of women.102 For example, bans on sex-selective
abortion burden reproductive rights and bans on veils impinge on free
exercise of religion.103 In weighing costs and benefits of bans on
cross-border practices, people in migrant-receiving countries may
erroneously overvalue the negative impact of the practice,
particularly if they assume that the consequences of the practice are
the same in their own country as they are in the country of origin of
the immigrant.
American feminist legal theory might suggest that we need only
focus on the context where a regulation is being considered (i.e., the
migrant-receiving country). On the other hand, international human
rights law and theory shines light on the context where the practice
first emerged and was first labeled as oppressive to women (i.e., the
migrant-sending country).
The insights in the field of transnational law draw attention to the
importance of both the migrant-receiving and migrant-sending
contexts in evaluating whether a regulation by a migrant-receiving
country on immigrant women’s behavior will promote equality or
contravene it. Transnational law is distinct from international law,
which governs the relationships between countries. Transnational
law highlights the interactions of domestic laws in the increasingly
global web of connections among people, corporations, as well as
goods, services, and knowledge. Consequently, a transnational
101.
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103.

See Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 79; KALANTRY II, supra note 98. See generally
Sital Kalantry, Sex-Selective Abortion Bans: Anti-Immigration or Anti-Abortion?, 16
GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 140 (2015) (discussing sex selection bans and their perceptions
over time).
Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 78–80.
See id. at 64; Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism
Lifts the Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 743, 757 (2006).
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approach encourages us to focus on multiple contexts in evaluating a
ban in one country.
In the migrant-receiving country, researchers and policymakers
should examine the gendered nature of social institutions, the historic
subjugation and inequality of women, and other factors that give
meaning to the practice as discriminatory to women in the migrantreceiving country. Researchers should also investigate the scope and
magnitude of the cross-border practice in question.
The migrant-receiving country context should also be examined in
detail. Researchers should attempt to determine how widespread the
practice is in that country. What are the individual motives for
women who undertake it? What societal institutions contribute to
giving meaning to the practice as discriminatory?
After understanding the practices in the two contexts (the context
where the practice is carried out by migrants and the context where
the practice has longer historical roots), I propose a comparative
study of these contexts. Do women undertake the practice at the
same rate? Do the same social institutions that contribute to the
practice exist in the country of destination? What (if any) societal
factors present in the migrant-receiving country that give rise to the
practice that are in fact not present in the migrant-sending country?
Are there different factors in the migrant-receiving country that
explain the reasons for the practice? Through this comparative study,
we can better determine the human rights impact of the practice in the
migrant-receiving countries.
In evaluating bans on cross-border practices, I caution
policymakers, feminists, voters, and others from relying too heavily
on the context of a foreign country in understanding a practice in
their own country even when it is undertaken by migrants from that
foreign country. At the same time, the context of the foreign country
cannot be ignored. It is important to understand the scope, results,
and causes of the same practice in another country and to compare
them to the scope, results, and causes of the practice in the migrantreceiving country. By doing this, we are able to determine whether
or not the factors that contribute to making a practice oppressive in
one context are also present in another country’s context.
Additionally, I encourage people in migrant-receiving countries
who think otherwise to recognize that culture is not fixed in time and
space and that it is not the sole driver for the behavior of immigrants
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in their country.104 Instead, motives for the behavior of immigrants
in the country of destination may be different than the motives for the
same behaviors in the country of origin of the migrant.105
Policymakers, feminists, and stakeholders should seek to understand
from women who engage in the practice their reasons for doing so.
For example, when veil-wearers in France were asked why they wore
the veil, some women said they do so as an assertion of their identity
in a country where they are a minority, not because they are forced to
do it.106
Finally, in evaluating restrictions on cross-border practices,
policymakers should be open to the possibility that a practice that
seems oppressive to women in one country is not oppressive in
another country. Failure to consider the contextual nature of crossborder practices means that in the name of promoting gender
equality, in some cases migrant-receiving countries are adopting
prohibitions that trample on the rights of immigrant women.
In the next section, I demonstrate how policymakers, feminists, and
others in France relied on information and their knowledge about the
practice of veiling in foreign countries to support a ban on veils that
cover a woman’s face in France.
IV. DECONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE FULL-FACE VEIL BAN
DISCOURSE IN FRANCE
In this section, I describe how behavior, motives, and harms were
decontextualized in the debates around the banning of the full-face
veil in France. I refer to “decontextualization” as taking information
about certain groups of people whose behaviors, motives, and
attitudes are shaped by and respond to a certain political, historical,
economic, and social context and then transposing that information to
another group of people who live in a completely different context.107
In 2004, France prohibited girls from wearing headscarves in
schools.108 Six years later, in 2010, France banned women from
104.

105.
106.
107.
108.

See generally Francine D. Blau, Immigrants and Gender Roles: Assimilation vs.
Culture (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 9534, 2015),
http://ftp.iza.org/dp9534.pdf (discussing the influence of culture on immigrant
women’s behavior).
See, e.g., Kalantry I, supra note 11, at 78 (proposing a “country-by-country”
approach to sex selection).
JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL 137 (Ruth O’Brien ed., 2007).
See infra Part V.
Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le
port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles,
collèges et lycées publics [Law 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 17, 2004, p.
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covering their full faces in public spaces.109 The text of the law did
not specifically target Muslims, but it was clear that it was meant to
address their veils.110 The law applies only to full-face coverings and
states that “[n]o one may, in public places, wear clothing designed to
conceal the face.”111 These bans are largely justified in terms of
women’s equality.112
Some might believe that veil bans are motivated primarily by an
animus towards Muslims and that women’s equality is merely a
secondary concern or a pretext.113 To these people, women’s equality
arguments are deployed as a strategy to gain support for the ban.114
Even if that is true, many people who are not primarily motivated by
racial or anti-Muslim bias support the veil ban.115 In France, many
veil-ban advocates truly believe that the veil is oppressive to
women.116 The trouble is that rampant reference to other contexts
clouds an accurate understanding of the situation in France.
During the discussions surrounding the veil ban, the perception of
the magnitude of the practice was greater than the reality. One of the
justifications for the ban was safety: it was necessary to protect the
public.117 The French government argued that veiled women could
commit identity fraud by covering their faces.118 France could only
have been concerned about public safety if policymakers thought that
people were veiling in great numbers. However, the reality is that
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5190. The House of Representatives has translated this law as follows: “in schools,
junior high schools and high schools, signs and dress that conspicuously show the
religious affiliation of students are forbidden.” H.R. Res. 528, 108th Cong. (2004),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-resolution/528/text.
Jennifer Heider, Unveiling the Truth Behind the French Burqa Ban: The
Unwarranted Restriction of the Right to Freedom of Religion and the European
Court of Human Rights, 22 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93, 93 & n.7 (2012).
Id. at 95.
Loi n° 2010-776 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace
public [Law 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 on the Prohibition on the Concealment
of the Face in Public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344, translated in S.A.S. v.
France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, ¶ 74.
See Heider, supra note 109, at 116–17.
See, e.g., Bennoune, supra note 74, at 394 (justifying veil bans by citing women’s
rights, when Islamophobia is the real motivation).
See, e.g., id. (“Some [human rights advocates] seem to be less willing to decry
violations of women’s human rights, in the Muslim world and Muslim communities,
including those that involve pressure to wear ‘modest’ dress, because of the rise in
prejudice against Muslims and Islam.”).
See Heider, supra note 109, at 93.
S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, ¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 82.
Id.
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very few women were wearing the full-face veil in France at the time
of the ban.
Indeed, a study cited by the European Court of Human Rights
found that only 1900 women in France wore the full-face covering.119
It seems that people who pushed for the law assumed that because
women in some Muslim countries wear the veil, many Muslim
women living in France may also be veiling.120 Perhaps this
assumption developed in response to a growing Muslim immigrant
population in France.121 Contrary to widespread assumptions,
however, empirical studies have found that the face veil is not worn
exclusively by recent immigrants.122 European-born women—
women who have lived in Europe most of their lives—and European
religious converts both were shown to wear face veils.123
Alternatively, the rationale could have been symbolic: policymakers
wanted to take a stand against a practice they found to be oppressive
even though proponents of the practice claimed it was part of their
religion.
Eva Brems, a human rights professor at Ghent University, points
out that women who wore the veil were rarely consulted about their
reasons for wearing it.124 When the Parliamentary Commission of
Inquiry in France evaluated the ban, it “heard about 200 witnesses
and experts.”125 The Commission “sent out questionnaires to several
French Embassies.”126 But it failed to seek out a single woman who
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Id. ¶ 145.
See generally id. ¶ 16 (demonstrating that the belief that a majority of Muslim
women in France wear a full-face veil is inaccurate because the veil “was a recent
phenomenon in France” and was worn only by an estimated 1,900 women).
See Adam Taylor, Map: France’s Growing Muslim Population, WASH. POST (Jan. 9,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/01/09/mapfrances-growing-muslim-population/; PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW
RESEARCH CTR., THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION 127, 130 (2011),
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2011/01/FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDFFeb10.pdf.
Eva Brems, Introduction to the Volume, in THE EXPERIENCES OF FACE VEIL
WEARERS IN EUROPE AND THE LAW 13 (Eva Brems ed., 2014) [hereinafter Brems I].
See id.; A Voice Behind the Veil: Planning to Defy a French Law, TIME,
http://content.time.com/time/video/player/0,32068,753330077001_2042878,00.html
(last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (interviewing a Muslim woman who was born and raised
in France that chose to wear a face veil because of her spirituality).
See Brems I, supra note 122, at 2–3.
Eva Brems, Face Veil Bans in the European Court of Human Rights: The
Importance of Empirical Findings, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 517, 517–18 (2014) [hereinafter
Brems II].
Id.
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actually wore a face veil.127 The lone exception was one woman,
who appeared before the Commission at her own request.128
Some people perceive that women in foreign countries are forced
or coerced to wear veils.129 Instead of conducting empirical research
about why women veiled in France, some people may have relied on
their understanding of the reasons for veiling in foreign countries.
Moreover, many scholars have argued against the coercion narrative
that prevails about veiling. Saba Mahmood, for example, has pointed
out that wearing the veil is empowering to women even in countries
where it is common practice.130 Leila Ahmed’s work about the
resurgence of the veil also notes that for many women it is
voluntary.131
The narrative that Muslim women are coerced to wear a veil in
Islamic countries is then projected onto Muslim women living in
France. According to Joan Scott’s work, The Politics of the Veil,
“two investigative bodies [were] appointed to look into the issue of
headscarves in public schools.”132
They found that wearing
headscarves was “either . . . a denial of freedom or a loss of
reason.”133 Scott notes that, in the French debate, the veil has never
been seen as “reasonable choice.”134 While the investigative bodies
admitted that “a few (certains) girls considered the veil a means of
emancipation, the National Assembly study group insisted that many
more (beaucoup) felt it oppressive.”135 According to psychoanalyst
Elisabeth Roudinesco, the veil was thought to be a “curtain” that
shrouds young girls in silence.136 Of course, as Scott points out, there
was no actual data to support the claim.137 The coercion narrative
also underlays the 2010 law, which contains a provision punishing
people who force a woman to conceal her face.138 There are probably
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See SCOTT, supra note 106, at 129.
Id.
Id.
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women who wear the face veil due to overt or implicit coercion, but
those situations are overstated in the debates.139
The coercion narrative prevailed in France despite the fact that
many Muslim women argued that they wore the veil because of
“individual choice and not community pressure.”140 Women who
wore the veil in France also pointed out that they wore it for different
reasons than women in Muslim-majority countries.141 In interviews,
girls said they wore veils as an expression of self-identity in a country
where they are a minority.142 Some women wore the veil precisely
because it was used to discriminate against Muslims in France.143 By
embracing a symbol that was used to discriminate against them, they
lessened the power of its oppression.144 It should be noted that not all
Muslim women oppose the ban.145 Some French Muslim women’s
rights activists agree that the veil is “a tool of oppression, alienation,
discrimination, and an instrument of men’s power over women.”146
Unlike countries where the veil is required by law or by social
pressure, women in France are exposed to the view that the veil is
contrary to gender equality.147 While in some countries there may be
societal pressure to veil, in France the mainstream societal pressure is
the opposite.148 The only pressure to veil (if at all) in France would
be from family, relatives, and other friends with the same beliefs.149
Although this pressure can be significant, it is not the same as the
pressure to conform to societal norms in countries where veiling is
widespread.
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See id. at 139.
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FRENCH WOMEN’S VOICES FROM THE GHETTO 100 (Helen Harden Chenut trans.,
Univ. Cal. Press, 2006) (2003)).
See SCOTT, supra note 106, at 153–54.
See Widespread Support for Banning Full Islamic Veil in Western Europe, PEW
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See generally Kim Willsher, French Muslim Women on Burqa Ban Ruling: ‘All I
Want Is to Live in Peace,’ GUARDIAN (July 1, 2014, 2:26 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/01/french-muslim-women-burqa-banruling (“[S]he had suffered ‘absolutely no pressure’ from her family or relatives to
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Moreover, in many other countries, such as Iran, women are
required to wear some form of veil by law.150 By comparing the
French situation to those countries, we are not able to clearly
understand the reasons women in France veil. It is fair to say that a
law that makes the veil mandatory is coercive. But it is problematic
to assume that it is coercive in France just because of the context
countries.
Many argued that women who claimed to veil voluntarily were
under a “false consciousness” or duped by their own religion.151 The
Constitutional Court of Belgium’s decision in upholding the veil ban
in Belgium exemplifies this position:
Even where the wearing of the full-face veil is the result of
a deliberate choice on the part of the woman, the principle
of gender equality, which the legislature has rightly
regarded as a fundamental value of democratic society,
justifies the opposition by the State, in the public sphere, to
the manifestation of a religious conviction by conduct that
cannot be reconciled with this principle of gender
equality. . . . [T]he wearing of a full-face veil deprives
women – to whom this requirement is solely applicable – of
a fundamental element of their individuality which is
indispensable for living in society and for the establishment
of social contacts.152
The court argued that even in respect of women who chose to veil
themselves, they were denying themselves gender equality.153 By
this argument, the court imposed its version of gender equality on all
150.
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Ramin Mostaghim, Protest over Islamic Dress Code Clogs Tehran Streets, L.A.
TIMES (May 7, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fgiran-dress-code-protest-20140507-story.html; Swati Sharma, MAP: Where Islamic
Veils Are Banned – and Where They Are Mandatory, WASH. POST (July 1, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/07/01/map-whereislamic-veils-are-banned-and-where-they-are-mandatory/.
See William Langley, France’s Burka Ban is a Victory for Tolerance, TELEGRAPH
(Oct. 21, 2014, 7:30 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8444177/BurkaFranceNa
tional-FrontMarine-Le-PenMuslimFadela-AmaraAndre-Gerinhijab.html; Daniel
Weinstock - Feminism, the Veil, and the Problem of False Consciousness (ASI 2014),
MCGILL: BLOGS (July 18, 2014, 8:42 PM),
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S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, ¶ 42 (emphasis added).
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women and disregarded women’s decisions about their competing
priorities (e.g., the right to religion, right to identity, gender equality,
etc.) that are at stake in the decision to wear the veil.154
The idea that Muslim women who veil themselves have no agency
was recently articulated by Laurence Rossignol, the French minister
of women’s rights, in a controversy around women’s fashion.155
Objecting to designer labels that have begun to create modest dress
for women, including fashion styles that cover a woman’s hair, Ms.
Rossignol argued that “[w]hen brands invest in this Islamic garment
market, they are shirking their responsibilities and are promoting
women’s bodies being locked up.”156 She then compared Muslim
women to “consenting slaves,” but later recanted that part of her
statement.157 As noted above, after the brutal massacre by a terrorist
in Nice, France, many French cities have begun to ban modest
swimwear that Muslim women wear, known as the “burkini.”158
In addition to ascribing motives based on their understanding in
foreign countries, some people in France also assumed that the
consequences of allowing women to veil in France would be similar
to those in foreign countries.159 Caroline Fourest, a leading supporter
of the headscarf ban in schools, insists that “Islamists were engaged
in a political conspiracy the aim of which was the oppression of
women and the elimination of secularism—in short, that the
experience of Iran was about to be imported into France.” 160 The
claim, therefore, was that the veil was part of the oppression of
women in Iran and that oppression would be replicated in France.161
In this section, I have shown how perceptions about why women veil
in other countries (which themselves were sometimes inaccurate)
were used to further bans on veiling in France. With the emphasis on
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/08/16/burkini-beachbrawl-leads-third-french-city-in-a-week-to-ban-the-swimsuit-for-muslim-women/.
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how the veil may be used as a tool of oppression by some
governments, the voices of women in France who claim the veil as an
expression of religion and identity were sidelined. In the next
section, I discuss how the European Court of Human Rights opinion
upholding France’s full-face veil ban relied on its decision about a
veil ban in a Muslim-majority country.
V. DECONTEXTUALIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS DECISION ON FRANCE’S FULLFACE VEIL BAN
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR or court) reviews
petitions brought by individuals against countries that are signatories
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) alleging violations under
the Convention.162 In 2011, a French woman brought a petition to the
ECHR arguing that France’s full-face veil ban discussed above
violates a number of provisions of the Convention.163 The main
claim the ECHR opinion focused on was whether the French veil ban
violates a woman’s right to express her religious views.164 I
demonstrate how the court referred to a case from another context
(Turkey) in justifying its decision to uphold the French veil ban.165 I
argue that it relied too heavily on justifications for a veil ban in
another context in making a decision to uphold the ban in France.
Article 9 of the Convention states that everyone has the “[f]reedom
to manifest one’s religion or beliefs.”166 The ECHR agreed that the
petitioner was indeed exercising her religious beliefs when she chose
to wear the veil (which she noted she did only occasionally).167 But
this right is not without limit in the Convention. The exercise of
one’s religion can be limited by the state if “necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”168 France offered a
number of reasons for the limitation, including a public safety
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), COUNCIL EUR.,
http://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/bodies/echr_en.asp (last visited Dec. 19,
2016).
S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, ¶¶ 1, 3.
Id. ¶¶ 74, 107–62.
See id. ¶¶ 135–39, 151.
Convention, supra note 83, at art. 9(2).
See S.A.S., 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 56–58.
Convention, supra note 83, at art. 8(2).
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rationale.169 The court rejected the public safety rationale because it
found that the state could simply require women to remove their
coverings when needed to verify their identities and that there was no
other general public safety threat being caused by women wearing
veils.170
The court also rejected gender equality as an appropriate reason to
limit exercise of religious liberty because the petitioner who was
asking for the right to veil was a woman.171 The court noted that
“[France] cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice
that is defended by women—such as the applicant.”172 In rejecting
gender equality as a rationale, the court avoided the objectionable
presumption that women who veil do so because they are duped or
have a “false consciousness.”173
But the court did find one justification offered by France to be
persuasive. It found that wearing the veil contravenes the notion of
“living together.”174 The court stated:
[It] takes into account the respondent State’s point that the
face plays an important role in social interaction. It can
understand the view that individuals who are present in
places open to all may not wish to see practices or attitudes
developing there which would fundamentally call into
question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships,
which, by virtue of an established consensus, forms an
indispensable element of community life within the society
in question. The Court is therefore able to accept that the
barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is
perceived by the respondent State as breaching the right of
others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living
together easier.175
The court further pointed out that: “From that perspective, the
respondent State is seeking to protect a principle of interaction
between individuals, which in its view is essential for the expression
not only of pluralism, but also of tolerance and broadmindedness
without which there is no democratic society.”176
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

S.A.S., 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 81–82.
Id. ¶ 139.
Id. ¶ 119.
Id.
See id.
Id. ¶ 122.
Id.
Id. ¶ 153.
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The court reasoned that although wearing the face veil was a valid
exercise of the freedom of religion guaranteed under the Convention,
the veil prevented people in France from living together.177 It further
found that “living together” was an element of the “protection of the
rights and freedoms of others,” which is a valid reason under the
Convention for a state to limit a person’s exercise of religion.178 The
court allowed for restrictions on religious freedom even if, in
exercising his or her religious freedom, a person infringes upon
others’ rights by creating barriers to interactions between people.179
The dissent was quick to point out that “[t]he very general concept
of ‘living together’ does not fall directly under any of the rights and
[guarantees] . . . within the Convention.”180 Eva Brems is even more
pointed—she correctly argues that there is no legal right to “see the
face of others in a public space.”181 She further points out that in her
empirical study she found that veil-wearers reported to have
significant public exchanges and connections.182 She reports that
many women she interviewed expressed a self-image that included
them as open or sociable persons.183 The women felt communication
was possible even when wearing a full-face veil.184 The idea of
equating social exchange with “face-to-face” interactions is a
Western cultural notion.185
The court essentially found that the concept, “living together,”
which does not even rise to the level of a right, trumps another
person’s fundamental right to religious expression.186 Upon finding
that limiting the religious exercise of face veil wearers was
permissible under the Convention, the court then gave wide latitude
and deference to France’s interpretation by using a doctrine called
“margin of appreciation.”187 This doctrine gives countries great
discretion in adopting laws in “grey areas” where there is not a clear
contravention of the Convention.188

177.
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179.
180.
181.
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183.
184.
185.
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Id. ¶¶ 125–27.
Id. ¶ 157.
Id. ¶¶ 140–42.
Id. ¶ 5 (Nußberger & Jäderblom, JJ., dissenting).
Brems II, supra note 125, at 536.
Id. at 538–40.
Id. at 539.
Id.
See id. at 537 & n.76.
See S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, ¶ 43.
Id. ¶¶ 155, 161.
Id. ¶ 129.
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However, in this balancing of rights, it does not seem appropriate
to deny someone her right to religion (which is an established
fundamental and human right in most jurisdictions, including under
the European Convention on Human Rights) in favor of others who
feel they are not able to “live together” with someone who is
covering her face. The court accepted a weak justification for the
law. It may have done so because it agrees that full-face veil bans
promote women’s equality. However, it may not have wanted to
explicitly articulate that position because then it would be implying
the woman who was challenging the veil ban was under a “false
consciousness” or duped by her religion.189
In holding in favor of France, the court refused to follow other
commentators who noted that the veil ban contravened the
Convention.190 For example, it rejected the viewpoint of the
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe that
“[p]rohibition of the burqa and the niqab will not liberate oppressed
women, but might instead lead to their further exclusion and
alienation in European societies.”191 The court also refused to follow
the Supreme Court of Spain, which found a veil ban unconstitutional
because of the voluntary nature of the full-face veil.192 In that case,
the Spanish court found that it was not possible to restrict a
constitutional freedom based on the mere supposition that women
who wore veils did so under duress.193 The Spanish court concluded
that the limitations in question could not be regarded as necessary in
a democratic society.194
Lastly, the court that adjudicated the French full-face veil ban paid
no heed to academic legal writings that cautioned that a ban on the
wearing of the full-face veil would result in isolating the same
women it was meant to protect, and it would “[t]hus be incompatible
with the objective of ensuring the social integration of groups of
immigrant origin.”195
In justifying its decision, the court cited Sahin v. Turkey, in which
the ECHR found that Turkey’s law banning headscarves in
189.
190.
191.

192.
193.
194.
195.

See generally id. ¶¶ 24–25 (concluding that the criminalization of a full-face veil
interfered impermissibly with the “aim of protecting the idea of ‘living together’”).
SAS v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341 ¶ 106–07.
Id. ¶ 37 (quoting Thomas Hammarberg, Human Rights in Europe: No Ground for
Complacency, Counsel of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 39 (Aug. 3,
2010), http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/source/prems/HR-Europe-no-groundscomplacency_en.pdf).
Id. ¶ 46–47.
Id. ¶ 137.
Id. ¶ 139.
Id. ¶ 47.
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universities did not violate the Convention.196 Unlike most domestic
courts, the ECHR is not bound by its prior decisions (i.e., they have
no precedential value).197 However, in an empirical study of ECHR
decisions, Yonatan Lupu and Erik Voeten argued that the ECHR uses
prior decisions much in the same way as U.S. courts as well as other
common law courts do.198 Moreover, even though it cites prior
decisions, the ECHR does so without consideration of the country’s
context.199
The court cited Sahin seventeen times in its decision on the French
veil ban.200 Each time the court referred to Sahin, it was for
propositions that ultimately supported its legal conclusion in favor of
France.201 For example, in citing Sahin as well as other cases, the
court notes that “[i]n democratic societies, in which several religions
coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to
place limitations on freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs in
order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that
everyone’s beliefs are respected.”202 The court again cites Sahin to
support the view that restrictions on religious garb do not violate
Article 9 of the Convention.203
Moreover, even though the court extensively referred to Sahin in
the opinion in which it held the French veil ban did not violate the
Convention, it did not once distinguish the political and social
context of Turkey from that of France.204 Its failure to specifically
articulate the differences between the French context and the Turkish
context is even more surprising given that the court specifically noted
in its opinion that context matters in adjudicating bans on behavior in
the name of women’s rights.205
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. ¶ 130 (quoting Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 122–23
(2004), aff’d, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005)).
But see Yonatan Lupu & Erik Voeten, Precedent in International Courts: A Network
Analysis of Case Citations by the European Court of Human Rights, 42 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 413, 413 (2012).
See id. at 413–14.
Id. at 413, 433.
S.A.S., 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 114, 119, 124–33.
Id.
Id. ¶ 126 (citing Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 106 (2004),
aff’d, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005)).
Id. ¶ 133 (citing Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 109–10).
Id. ¶ 114, 119, 124–131, 133.
Id. ¶ 130 (“It observed that the rules in this sphere would consequently vary from
one country to another according to national traditions and the requirements imposed
by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order.
It concluded from this that the choice of the extent and form of such rules must
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In Sahin, the ECHR found that Turkey’s ban of headscarves only in
universities was necessary to protect the “rights and freedoms of
others” and the “protecting [of] public order.”206 The court agreed
that “[i]mposing limitations on freedom in this sphere may, therefore,
be regarded as meeting a pressing social need by seeking to achieve
those two legitimate aims, especially since, as the Turkish courts
stated[], this religious symbol has taken on political significance in
Turkey in recent years.”207
Although the ECHR failed to mention it, the circumstances in the
Sahin case are clearly distinguishable from those in the French fullface veil ban case.208 The court in Sahin justified its holding on the
ground that there was evidence that the pressure to veil was in fact
coming from a rising radical interpretation of Islam.209 Perhaps the
veil was being used as a way to maintain and perpetuate inequality.210
Some commentators have also argued that the reason that the Sahin
court allowed the Turkish veil ban was because the veil was being
used as a symbol for the radical Islam that was gaining hold in
Turkey.211
Karima Bennoune argues that the Turkish ban was appropriate
because “[e]ven to the extent that for some women, the choice to
wear a headscarf is their own, and is for them an expression of
religious belief, this limitation on that choice is necessary in context
to protect the rights of others.”212 In particular, she notes that “[n]onwearers of such garb risk becoming outsiders, seen as not fully or
equally Muslim.”213 She goes on to say that bans are appropriate in
public educational institutions because those institutions shape the
identities of future generations and forge the public consensus about
gender roles and equality.214
However, none of these rationales apply in France. The veil is not
part of a political discourse between two competing Islamic political
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207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

212.
213.
214.

inevitably be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it would depend on the
specific domestic context.”) (citing Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 109)).
Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 99.
Id. ¶ 115.
See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text; infra notes 209–19 and
accompanying text.
See Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 115.
See id. ¶ 11 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
Jacco Bomhoff, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey: ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment, COMP. L.
BLOG (Nov. 11, 2005, 1:36 PM),
http://comparativelawblog.blogspot.com/2005/11/leyla-sahin-v-turkey-echrgrand.html.
Bennoune, supra note 74, at 386.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 386.
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groups.215 In France, the ban applies in all public places and is not
just limited to schools.216 Yet, while the court relied heavily on
Sahin, it failed to appropriately distinguish the context of the Turkish
ban from the context of the French ban.217 In addition, where there is
societal, political, or religious pressure to veil (as in Turkey
according to the Sahin court), it would seem appropriate for a
government to desire to counter that pressure for the sake of
promoting gender equality.218 On the other hand, because so few
women in France wear the full-face veil or any veil, the dress of a
certain group of women would not lead other women in French
society to start veiling themselves, nor is veiling part of the
mainstream culture.219 It should be noted that the ban in Sahin
involved headscarves, whereas France banned women from covering
their face. While this distinction could have been relevant, it was not
raised by the court in upholding the French full-face veil ban.
The court, by relying on the Sahin decision in adjudicating a case
arising in France, inaccurately tilted the equation towards upholding
the ban.220 Too much emphasis is placed on one version of gender
equality. Furthermore, by relying on the rationale in Sahin, the court
placed too little emphasis on other motives a woman may have to veil
in country where she is a member of a minority religion.221
By making the comparison to Turkey, the court inadvertently
suggested that the impact of a ban in Turkey would have the same
benefits (e.g., promoting women’s equality with men) as a ban in
France.222 By its focus on a case arising in Turkey, the court also
failed to give weight to the negative consequences the ban would
have in France’s specific political and social context (e.g., repressing
minority immigrant women who wish to express their religion as
distinct from the mainstream secular views).223
It makes sense that the ECHR should not be bound by its prior
decisions because it adjudicates cases across many different countries
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Compare id. at 379 (noting the fears of the secularist Turkish government over rising
religious fundamentalism), with id. at 414 (noting that the French ban was primarily
motivated by the intent to preserve strict separation between church and state).
S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, ¶ 74.
See supra notes 204–11 and accompanying text.
Bennoune, supra note 74, at 389–90.
Id. at 389, 395.
Id. at 390–92.
See S.A.S., 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 130; see also Sahin v. Turkey, App. No.
44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 10 (2004), aff’d, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005)
(Tulkins, J., dissenting).
See S.A.S., 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 130, 135.
See id.; supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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and contexts.224 Depending on the larger social, historical, and
economic contexts, the court may come out one way in a case from
one country and reach the opposite conclusion in a case from another
country with a similar set of facts.225 However, it did not do this in
S.A.S. v. France; instead the court justifies its legal conclusion by
referring to the Sahin case, which involved a ban on headscarves by
Turkey in educational institutions.226 While upholding the ban in
Turkey may have been perfectly appropriate to further gender
equality, it should have had little bearing on whether or not a veil ban
would promote gender equality in France.227 The court’s reliance on
the Turkish decision suggests that it failed to appreciate how context
is so crucial in determining whether or not a behavior contravenes
gender equality or women’s rights.228
VI. TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST APPROACH
TO BANS ON WEARING VEILS
Although the type of in-depth analysis necessary to draw a
conclusion about the women’s rights implications of a veil ban in
France is beyond the scope of this article, I make preliminary
observations about how a transnational feminist methodology could
be deployed to evaluate the French veil ban as well as veil bans in
other migrant-receiving countries.
In evaluating a ban on veils in a migrant-receiving country,
policymakers should not decontextualize. That is, they should avoid
using information about practices from one country to evaluate laws
in their own country. In Part III, I pointed out the ways in which the
discussions about the veil ban in France decontextualized.229 I also
explained how, in evaluating the veil bans, the ECHR was not
sufficiently sensitive to the fact that a veil ban may promote women’s
equality in one country, but may have a different result in another
country.230
Legislatures, unlike courts, do not articulate the competing rights
that are at stake in adopting policies, nor do they explain how they
224.
225.
226.
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228.
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230.

European Court of Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
http://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/bodies/echr_en.asp (last visited Dec. 19,
2016).
Heider, supra note 109, at 105.
See S.A.S., 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 130.
Heider, supra note 109, at 105.
Cochav Elkayam-Levy, Women’s Rights and Religion - The Missing Element in
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1189–90, 1192 (2014).
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have reconciled those competing rights.231 French policymakers may
have thought that the benefits of the ban are that it advances women’s
equality by prohibiting a practice that they believe to be rooted in and
causes gender oppression.232
Those perceived benefits then
outweighed the costs of the ban, which was the prohibition on
exercising religious beliefs.233
By decontextualizing, policymakers and voters have overvalued the
benefits of the ban in France.234 In countries that require the veil by
law—and even in countries that do not require it by law, but still
punish uncovered women (e.g., there have been reports of Taliban
members using sticks to beat parts of women’s bodies that are
exposed)—wearing the veil impinges on women’s equality rights
because women have no choice but to wear it.235 Thus, in these
countries, banning it may enhance gender equality.236 However, this
does not mean that the veil is oppressive to women who wear it in
countries such as France, where wearing a veil is not required to be
worn by law. Nevertheless, the harms that ensue from mandatory
veiling in other countries were transposed to discussions about
legislation in France.237 Therefore, the perceived benefits from
banning the veil were greater than the actual benefits in France.
Relatedly, the costs associated with adopting the ban were
undervalued. Because many supporters of the ban decontextualized
231.
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237.

The Right to Reasoned Decisions, B. TRIBUNALS & ADJUDICATION SERV.,
http://www.tbtas.org.uk/policies-guidance-and-publications/newsletters/the-right-toreasoned-decisions (last visited Dec. 19, 2016); see Member State Law - France,
EUR. JUST., https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_member_state_law-6-fren.do?member=1 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
See Anne Roberts, Veiled Politics: Legitimating the Burqa Ban in the French Press
(Dec. 14, 2011) (unpublished thesis, Georgia State University) (on file with
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/communication_theses/78).
Id. at 17–19.
See Jake Cigainero, Five Years into Ban, Burqa Divide Widens in France, DW (Oct.
4, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/five-years-into-ban-burqa-divide-widens-infrance/a-19177275.
See Women in Afghanistan: The Back Story, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 25, 2013, 3:20
PM), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/womens-rights-afghanistanhistory#.VbkuUfN_Oko.
See Sital Kalantry, Does a Ban on Wearing the Full Veil Promote Women’s
Equality? An Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights Decision,
INTLAWGRRLS BLOG (July 9, 2014) [hereinafter Kalantry III],
https://ilg2.org/2014/07/09/does-a-ban-on-wearing-the-full-veil-promote-womensequality-an-analysis-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-decision/ (“When
discussing the question of whether or not the veil ban promotes women’s equality, it
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The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC (July 1, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13038095.
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behavior, they thought that women who wore the veil were coerced
and those who claimed to wear it voluntarily were “duped” by their
religion.238 By decontextualizing motives, supporters of the ban
refused to accept Muslim women’s claims that the veil was an
expression of their religious identity.239 Thus, religious freedom and
other motives for veiling in France were undervalued.240 By
contextualizing the ban, migrant-receiving countries and courts
would make better policy decisions. They would resist the tendency
to overvalue the benefits and undervalue the costs of bans on
women’s behavior.
Instead of decontextualizing, policymakers and researchers should
study the context of the migrant-receiving country. Using empirical
quantitative and qualitative methods, they should assess the scope of
full-face veiling in France, the reasons it is undertaken, and should
take seriously the reasons offered by the women who wear full-face
veils. Only through an in-depth study will a clear picture about the
cross-border practice emerge.
While decontextualization should be resisted, this does not mean
that the context where the practice first emerged is not relevant. The
practice of veiling is part of a traditional practice in several countries
in the world. Information about human rights violations travels
quickly across the globe, but this information is often filtered through
sound bites and stereotypes. Researchers could study one or more
countries where veiling initially emerged to understand whether (and
why) it is considered discriminatory or oppressive to women in that
country. What is its scope? What are the relevant social and political
institutions that give meaning to it as discriminatory?
Once the practice is understood in these multiple contexts, a
comparative approach would help focus on factors that explain why a
practice may be discriminatory or problematic in one context, but not
in another. For example, if social custom or pressure exists in one
country, then a ban on the practice may be more appropriate in that
country than it would be where the mainstream social mores do not
favor (or oppose) the practice.
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A transnational feminist approach to veil bans suggests that courts,
policymakers, and feminists should be open to the possibility that a
veil ban promotes equality in some contexts and not in others.241 In
one country, the veil may be a tool of political and gender repression;
in another country, it may be an assertion of religious identity of a
minority.242 Karima Bennoune also suggests that veil bans should be
evaluated within the context in which they emerge.243 However, in
the two countries she examined, she felt veil bans were justified.244
The idea that a practice is contrary to human rights in one context
and not in another defies the dominant paradigm of the universality
of rights. Many feminists and human rights advocates assert that
veiling is oppressive no matter where the practice emerges.245 Others
believe that bans violate women’s rights no matter what country
adopts them.246 For example, Amnesty International objected to the
ECHR’s failure to find that France’s full-face ban violated the
European Convention of Human Rights and also objected when that
same court failed to hold that Turkey’s ban on headscarves in
universities violated that Convention.247
However, consider the most extreme case where a country requires
women to wear some form of veil by law and the practice has
historically been used as tool of oppression. If that country passed a
law prohibiting women from wearing any veil, few would decry the
new law as a contravention of women’s equality. Some women in
that country might argue that the new ban violates their religious
rights, but the government would have a strong argument that its veil
ban is part of a larger strategy to combat structural inequality in
society. In a country where few women wear the veil, it is less
plausible that a ban could be appropriate to promote women’s
241.
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rights.248 A migrant-receiving country might argue that its ban
promotes the rights of women who would otherwise wear a veil, but
that argument ignores those same women’s rights to assert their
religious identity.
VII. CONCLUSION
Lawmakers in migrant-receiving countries sometimes enact
regulations on immigrant women’s behavior based on perceptions
that the practice is discriminatory to women in foreign countries.249
Often this perception about the foreign country itself is distorted.250
They also fail to appreciate that the impact of the practice could
change when it is transposed to another country.251 I have shown
here how some supporters of the face-veil ban in France justified it,
in part, because the veil is seen as a tool of oppression in other parts
of the world.252 The transnational feminist perspective calls for
recognizing and resisting these decontextualized views.253 It also
recognizes that practices change meaning with context—a practice
that is oppressive or discriminatory to women in one context is not
necessarily oppressive or discriminatory in another context. Finally,
it calls for an in-depth understanding and comparison of the practice
in multiple contexts.
Global migration continues unabated.254 The transplantation of
people from one country to another has given rise to hotly contested
questions about women’s human rights. Veil bans, as well as other
bans, are being considered and debated in migrant-receiving
countries around the world.255 Canada, for example, recently banned
the full-face veil in citizenship ceremonies.256 Bans on cross-border
248.
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practices will continue to be discussed around the world. The
“burkini” ban mentioned in the introduction is only one such
example.257
While there was little world reaction against France’s full-face veil
ban imposed in 2010, world opinion railed against the burkini
bans.258 While French courts as well as the ECHR upheld the fullface veil ban, France’s highest administrative court has rejected the
burkini bans.259 Perhaps the negative reaction towards the burkini
bans may be because they were seen as a direct and unfair reaction to
the terrorist attacks in France.260 The global denunciation of the
burkini bans and the relative silence in reaction to the full-face veil
ban may also have to do with the differences between the
garments.261 The burkini does not cover the face, and there are
numerous fashionable iterations of it (some include colors other than
black). Additionally, many versions of the burkini are form-fitting,
and it covers only a woman’s body and hair.262
On the other hand, a full-face veil covers a woman’s face (except
her eyes), is black in color, and often associated with a loose, black
blanket-like covering over the body (known as a “burqa”).263
Another salient reason for the contrast in the reactions to the two bans
is that the full-face veil is a traditional piece of clothing associated
with oppression against women in some countries, unlike the burkini,
which was invented in 2004 by an Australian designer.264 In this
article, I have shown that policymakers, feminists, and stakeholders
erroneously overemphasize the context of foreign countries when
regulating immigrant behavior in their own country. Instead, I
propose a transnational feminist methodology that provides a more
257.
258.
259.

260.
261.
262.
263.

264.

See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
Joseph V. Micallef, Is France Right to Ban the Burkini?, WORLDPOST (Sept. 3,
2016, 9:46 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-v-micallef/is-france-rightto-ban-th_b_11845732.html.
Lizzie Dearden, Burkini Ban Suspended: French Court Declares Law Forbidding
Swimwear Worn by Muslim Women ‘Clearly Illegal,’ INDEP. (Aug. 26, 2016),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/burkini-ban-french-france-courtsuspends-rule-law-forbidding-swimwear-worn-muslim-women-seriouslya7211396.html.
See id.
See Micallef, supra note 258.
Id.
See Radhika Sanghani, Burka Bans: The Countries Where Muslim Women Can’t
Wear Veils, TELEGRAPH (July 8, 2016, 7:00 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/life/burka-bans-the-countries-where-muslimwomen-cant-wear-veils/.
Heider, supra note 109, at 93; Micallef, supra note 258.
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nuanced lens to evaluate and resolve the competing women’s rights at
stake that arise in regulating certain practices of immigrant women.

